Wto Disputes By Agreement

Nineteen arbitrators under article 22, paragraph 6, have been withtrated so far; a list of these prices can be found under www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/226awards/suspensionawards.asp. Of the 19 awards, two concern retaliatory claims by the United States (European Communities – Measures on Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)(EC – Hormones)(DS26) and European Communities – Regime for the Import, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas)(DS27), while 12 awards are subject to retaliation by WTO Members against the United States. The 12 awards include litigation on five different issues: United States – Tax Treatment for « Foreign Distributors » (United States – FSC) (DS108); United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (DS136); United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (United States—CDSOA (Byrd Amendment))(DS217/DS234); United States – Subsidies for Highland Cotton (DS 267); and United States – measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services (DS285). The US has requested authorisation to impose sanctions on both EU hormones and EU bananas as a result of the arbitral awards and has imposed increased tariffs on EU goods in each case; The continuation of U.S. sanctions in the case of EC hormones is discussed in the text on pages 10-12. Article 39 is an important innovation in the protection of intellectual property under international law. It is « the first multilateral recognition of the essential role that trade secrets play in industry »38 and « the first multilateral agreement that explicitly obliges member countries to provide protection ». « Trade Secrets ». 39 A commentator on the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations concluding the WTO treaty noted: « The inclusion of trade secrets in the TRIPS Agreement has been hailed as an important innovation. » 40 Panel Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/R (31 March 2008); Panel Report, Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/R (31 March 2008). At the request of the parties to the dispute, the proceedings on the merits were initiated through a closed WTO television broadcast, which was the first time that public access was allowed under a WTO dispute settlement procedure. The parties to the dispute also agreed to such public access in several subsequent disputes. The use of the DSU revealed procedural shortcomings, particularly in the compliance phase of a dispute. These include the lack of coordination of DSU procedures for seeking retaliation with compliance panel application procedures, and the absence of a specific procedure to lift trade sanctions if the defending Member considers that it has fulfilled its WTO obligations in a case.

To fill these gaps, the disputing members have concluded bilateral agreements that allow for the continuation of retaliation and procedural and compliance procedures one after the other, and have launched new dispute settlement procedures to achieve the elimination of retaliatory measures that are supposed to have survived their legal basis […].