Cease Fire Line Agreement

2017 was the worst year of ceasefire violations between India and Pakistan since the 2003 agreement entered into force. India has accused Pakistan of 860 ceasefire violations along the Line of Control (LOC) and the working border along Jammu-Sialkot, while Pakistan has accused India of 1300 ceasefire violations that left an estimated 100 people dead in 2017 alone. Both sides say they are retaliating, accuse the other side of breaking the ceasefire in an « un provoked » manner and boast that an « appropriate response » has been given and that, on the other hand, a higher number of deaths has been deplored. 1. In accordance with the first part of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and in addition to the cessation of hostilities in the State of Jammu and Kashmir on 1 January 1949, a ceasefire line shall be established. There are several explanations for these events; They range from military factors at the local level at the border to more dynamic dynamics of internal and external political developments. But one thing is for sure, all these ceasefire violations are taking place because India and Pakistan do not have a formal written ceasefire agreement with clearly defined modalities or standard operating procedures (SOPs) to manage their borders. What is currently preventing India and Pakistan from opening fire on top of the other is a « ceasefire offer » by zafarullah Jamali, then Pakistani Prime Minister, on November 23, 2003, on the eve of Eid al-Fitr. India`s formal acceptance of the ceasefire took place a few days later in a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: « The directors general of military operations of India and Pakistan have agreed to abide by a ceasefire from midnight tonight along the international border [working border for Pakistan], from the control line and the actual ground position line (AGPL) to Siachen. In 1963, Pakistan signed an agreement with China and ceded about 2,000 square kilometers in northern Kashmir to China, which has held it all since. Yet India and Pakistan have no choice but to negotiate their differences sooner or later. In this context, some hopes for an early start to peace talks were raised when the national security advisers of India and Pakistan met in Bangkok on 26 December 2017 for « secret » talks.

But such hopes were quickly lost as ceasefire violations along the LOC continued at the same pace in the new year. The leaders of both countries must understand that the first item on their agenda at their next meeting must be the formalization of the 2003 ceasefire, as it will continue to jeopardize the future of the peace process if it is not resolved. . . .